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MID-ATLANTIC  ETHICS  COMMITTEE
N E W S L E T T E R
The Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee 
Newsletter is a publication of the 
Maryland Health Care Ethics 
Committee Network, an initiative of 
the University of Maryland Francis 
King Carey School of Law’s Law & 
Health Care Program. The Newsletter 
combines educational articles with 
timely information about bioethics 
activities. Each issue includes a feature 
article, a Calendar of upcoming 
events, and a case presentation and 
commentary by local experts in 
bioethics, law, medicine, nursing, or 
related disciplines. 
 Diane E. Hoﬀ mann, JD, MS - Editor
MARYLAND COURTS HEAR 
MEDICALLY INEFFECTIVE TREATMENT 
CASES
Over the past 14 months, two Mary-
land Circuit Courts have adjudicated 
cases involving the medically inef-
fective treatment provisions of the 
Maryland Health Care Decisions Act 
(HCDA). In each case, the provi-
sions were relied on by a health care 
provider to terminate a patient’s 
life-sustaining treatment. This article 
is based on the court papers ﬁ led in 
those cases, as well as conversations 
about the legal process with one 
or more attorneys involved in each 
case. Neither the health care provid-
ers from the medical institutions nor 
the attorneys disclosed any protected 
health information due to the restric-
tions imposed by Maryland law and 
HIPAA.
Case #1
On Friday, December 1, 2017, 
an attorney representing Harjeet 
Malhi, the father of Gurpreet Singh 
Malhi, a 32-year-old male patient 
in a persistent vegetative state and 
on a ventilator at Anne Arundel 
Medical Center (AAMC), ﬁ led a 
motion for a temporary restraining 
order (TRO) in the Circuit Court to 
prevent AAMC from disconnecting 
Gurpreet from the ventilator (Case 
No. C-02-CV-17-003473).    
Gurpreet, an Indian national 
temporarily residing in the United 
States, was admitted to the emer-
gency department at AAMC on 
t
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October 25, 2017 with a diagnosis of acute pancreatitis. Four days later, 
he suﬀ ered a cardiac arrest, went into a coma, subsequently diagnosed 
as a persistent vegetative state, and was placed on a ventilator. Approxi-
mately three and a half weeks later, based on the hospital’s policy on 
“unbeneﬁ cial treatment,” his treating physicians told his local family 
members that they were going to remove Gurpreet from the ventilator 
and discontinue other life-sustaining measures. The family members 
objected to the hospital’s plans. 
Gurpreet’s father, Harjeet, who spoke only Punjabi, traveled to Baltimore 
from India as soon as he could (Nov. 30) to see his son and meet with his 
physicians. Once he arrived, he also expressed his disagreement with the 
decision to remove Gurpreet from the ventilator and halt other medical 
treatment and implored the hospital and the treating physicians to wait 
until he had time to pursue other treatment options.
Concerned that the hospital would move forward with the plan to remove 
life-sustaining treatment (LST), on Dec. 1, Gurpreet’s father ﬁ led the 
motion for the TRO. The motion referred to provisions of the HCDA that 
allow a family member to make health care decisions for patients lacking 
decision-making capacity. The motion further stated that, according to 
the statute, if 
a health care provider intends not to comply with the wishes of
  a surrogate, at the request of the surrogate to transfer care to
 another facility, the provider will ‘. . . make every reasonable 
 eﬀ ort to transfer the patient to another health care provider, 
 . .  assist in the transfer; and . . . comply with the instruction of 
 the surrogate . . . if a failure to comply with the instruction would 
 likely result in the death of the individual.
On Dec. 5, the court granted the TRO and directed AAMC to forgo 
removing Gurpreet from the LST until a full adversarial hearing could be 
held. Subsequent to the granting of the TRO, Mr. Malhi ﬁ led an amended 
petition to temporarily and permanently enjoin the hospital from with-
drawing LST from Gurpreet and to order AAMC to meaningfully assist 
the family in the transfer of care.
The hearing, which included testimony from several family members, 
the treating doctor, and the hospital bioethicist, was held on Friday, Dec. 
15th. At the hearing, Mr. Malhi's attorney explained that her client was 
requesting a preliminary injunction to prevent the hospital from taking 
Gurpreet oﬀ  of LST and so that arrangements could be made to transport 
him to a hospital in India. The family had made eﬀ orts to transfer 
Gurpreet to several other hospitals in Maryland but none were willing to 
accept him in his current condition. The judge expressed concern about 
the cost of transport to India for a patient requiring ventilator support and 
asked whether there was any source of funding for the transfer, i.e., third 
party private or government insurance or other source. Because of the 
patient’s immigration status there was no public source of payment and
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the patient’s family had not yet ap-
proached the Embassy of India to 
see if it might oﬀ er assistance.
Witnesses called by Mr. Malhi's 
attorney included two relatives 
of the patient (a cousin and his 
uncle’s brother-in-law), in addition 
to Gurpreet’s father. Through their 
testimony, it was brought to the 
attention of the court that the hos-
pital had issued a "no escalation 
of care" order that was not in ac-
cordance with the family’s wishes. 
Subsequent to the order, they con-
tacted other Maryland hospitals to 
see if they would accept Gurpreet. 
Initially, one hospital’s intake co-
ordinator agreed to accept Gurpre-
et and place him on its wait list for 
care. After this, AAMC lifted the 
"no escalation" order and began 
to treat Gurpreet with antibiotics 
and blood transfusions as he had a 
blood infection that had not been 
treated because of the order. The 
day after this treatment, the fam-
ily members observed that some 
of his vital signs and lab numbers 
had improved and that he looked 
much better. They believed that 
with continued treatment he would 
have a chance to live. Gurpreet's 
father also testiﬁ ed that he had 
spoken to a physician in India who 
told him that he could get Gurpreet 
admitted to any one of a number 
of hospitals in New Delhi.
Also at the hearing, a physician 
from AAMC, who was an expert 
in pulmonary critical care and 
who had been involved in Mr. 
Malhi’s care, testiﬁ ed. She stated 
that Gupreet was a 32 y.o. man 
who had unfortunately sustained 
a few complications from his 
alcohol intake including delirium 
tremens and severe pancreatitis. 
The latter led to renal and respira-
tory failure and a cardiac arrest 
that resulted in brain damage. She 
further stated that he had been in a 
persistent vegetative state for eight 
weeks and that such a diagnosis 
is typically made after a patient is 
not aware of his or her surround-
ings for four weeks. After three 
months, a diagnosis of permanent 
vegetative state could be made. 
The physician further stated that 
she believed that any additional 
treatment of Gurpreet would be 
medically ineﬀ ective in that it 
would not prevent his death or 
deterioration. She told the fam-
ily that she believes the role of 
medicine is to prolong life, not to 
prolong death and the most hu-
mane thing for Gurpreet would be 
to ensure his comfort and not to 
prolong his death. Mr. Malhi's at-
torney asked if this would include 
continuing to give him nutrition 
and hydration. The physician 
responded that for a patient with 
renal failure, continuing to give 
him hydration and nutrition would 
likely mean he would experience 
his last days ﬁ lled with ﬂ uid and 
edematous, which would be very 
uncomfortable. Thus, in her view, 
it would not be appropriate to give 
him IV ﬂ uids.
Also, a note in the medical record 
by a nephrologist treating Gur-
preet was read into evidence. In 
the note, the nephrologist stated 
that he believed the provision of 
ongoing renal replacement therapy 
should be regarded as futile and 
for this reason “continuation of 
kidney dialysis has created an ethi-
cal conﬂ ict for me as a provider in 
this case.”
In closing remarks, Mr. Malhi's  
attorney stated that her client 
believed that his son would get 
much better care at his home in 
India and would like an opportu-
nity to ﬁ nd a way to get him there. 
She also said her client requested 
that, pending the transfer, the no 
escalation of care order be lifted 
to give Mr. Malhi the strength to 
withstand a transfer and asked for 
a reasonable length of time to get 
that done.
The attorney for AAMC stated that 
the legislature enacted a provision 
for medically ineﬀ ective treat-
ment for exactly this type of case, 
i.e., when artiﬁ cial care is only 
prolonging the dying process. He 
referred to the four legal require-
ments for granting a Preliminary 
Injunction (PI) (see Box, p.4) and 
stated that “the legislature has 
given us a clear indication of what 
the public interest is by enacting 
this provision. There is harm on 
both sides of the table. The patient 
is being harmed by continuing a 
painful dying process, the provid-
ers are being harmed by giving 
morally and ethically inappropri-
ate care and watching the patient 
suﬀ er when the law allows for 
discontinuing care.” Finally, he 
addressed the plaintiﬀ ’s chance of 
success on the merits, and con-
cluded that there was virtually no 
evidence that the plaintiﬀ s would 
be successful in ﬁ nding a hospital 
willing to accept transfer of the 
patient, that no hospitals they had 
contacted in the U.S. had agreed 
to take the patient and even if a 
hospital in India would agree to 
accept him, the transfer to India 
would be cost prohibitive. 
After the hearing, the court grant-
ed a time-limited PI prohibiting 
the hospital from removing Gur-
preet from the ventilator or discon-
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Patients ask Courts for TRO and Preliminary Injunction
In both the Malhi and Kwon cases, the patients asked the courts for a temporary restraining order, of-
ten referred to as a TRO, and a Preliminary Injunction. Both are forms of injunction but a temporary 
restraining order is typically issued in circumstances where immediate action is needed, speciﬁ cally, 
where there is not time for a court hearing on the issue because the requester will suﬀ er “immedi-
ate, substantial and irreparable injury” unless the order is issued. Courts often issue TROs based on 
aﬃ  davits from a person whose interests are about to be harmed. In Maryland, such injunctions may 
not remain in eﬀ ect more than ten days for a resident and not more than 35 days for a non-resident. A 
preliminary injunction, in contrast, is issued only after there has been an opportunity for a full ad-
versarial hearing on the issue. In both cases, the party seeking the injunction must prove each of the 
following four factors: (1) there is a high likelihood that they will prevail on the merits; 2) the harm 
to the plaintiﬀ  if the injunction is not granted will be greater than the harm to the defendant if it is 
granted; 3) the plaintiﬀ  will suﬀ er irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and 4) it is in the 
public interest to grant the injunction. In these cases, it will virtually always be the case that without 
the TRO patients will suﬀ er immediate, substantial and irreparable injury, as they will likely die with-
out continued life-sustaining treatment. 
tinuing other LST but denied 
the plaintiﬀ ’s request for escala-
tion of care, ﬁ nding that such 
additional treatment would be 
medically ineﬀ ective. The court 
ordered that the PI expire on 
Wednesday, December 20th, 
giving the family three full busi-
ness days to ﬁ nd a hospital that 
would accept Gurpreet. During 
that time period, the hospital was 
required to make "every reason-
able eﬀ ort to transfer the patient 
to another health care provider." 
The court stated that it could not 
ﬁ nd that the plaintiﬀ  would not 
be successful in ﬁ nding a place to 
transfer his son and that it would 
be in the public interest to allow 
the patient to return to his home 
in India. Also, in weighing the 
harms of denying the request to 
explore transfer, the court found 
that while the hospital would 
suﬀ er ﬁ nancial harms, the patient 
would suﬀ er irreparable harm. 
In light of this, the court ordered 
the plaintiﬀ  to post bond in the 
amount of $15,000 in three days 
to cover the hospital’s expenses of 
maintaining the patient on LST as 
the Maryland rule on injunctions 
requires posting of a bond for the 
costs of damages. If the bond was 
not posted in the required time 
frame the order would expire. The 
court also made it clear to the par-
ties that the chances that it would 
grant another extension of the PI if 
the plaintiﬀ  could not ﬁ nd another 
institution willing to accept the 
patient were "slim, if not nonex-
istent." In other words, the court 
was providing Gurpreet’s fam-
ily with one more opportunity to 
determine if another place of care 
was available. If they could not 
ﬁ nd a place within the three busi-
ness days, the PI would expire and 
the hospital could proceed with 
its plan to stop all life sustaining 
treatment.
The family was unable to ﬁ nd  
another provider who would ac-
cept the patient in the allotted time 
frame. Therefore, the family did 
not proceed with its claim for in-
junctive relief and the hospital 
ultimately removed the patient 
from the ventilator and other life 
support. 
Case #2
Less than a month after the Malhi 
case was decided by the Anne 
Arundel County Circuit Court, a 
second case involving medically 
ineﬀ ective treatment was ﬁ led 
in Baltimore City Circuit Court 
(Case No. 24-C-18-000189). The 
complaint was ﬁ led by Haeyoung 
Lee on January 12, 2018, on 
behalf of her husband, Hyok Won 
Kwon, a patient at Johns Hopkins 
Medical Center (JHMC). In Au-
gust 2017, Kwon was diagnosed 
with head and neck squamous 
cell carcinoma. He presented 
with a tumor that progressed 
from August to January from a 
lump below his right neck the 
"size of a large egg to a much 
larger mass that extend[ed] from 
the right side to the throat and 
the left side." Lee, who was also 
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Kwon’s agent under his durable 
power of attorney for health care, 
alleged that JHMC had refused 
to give curative treatment to her 
husband because of an erroneous 
assumption about his condition, 
speciﬁ cally that because he had 
asymptomatic tuberculosis he 
could not receive chemotherapy. 
She ﬁ led the complaint for “medi-
cal emergency injunctive relief” 
because on the evening of Janu-
ary 9, 2018 she was notiﬁ ed that 
JHMC personnel were planning to 
disconnect her husband the fol-
lowing morning from the ventila-
tor without the family’s consent 
and against her husband’s wishes. 
Lee called 911 and sought the as-
sistance of the police, who direct-
ed her to call the courthouse where 
she was able to obtain temporary 
relief – an administrative judge, 
by verbal order, on the morning of 
January 10th, required that JHMC 
keep Mr. Kwon on the ventilator 
until his family was able to initiate 
court proceedings on his behalf.
On Friday, January 12th, the court 
held an initial hearing on the case. 
Ms. Lee (acting pro se) and one of 
her daughters testiﬁ ed along with 
Mr. Kwon’s attending physician 
and the co-chair of the Hopkins 
Ethics Committee, who had con-
sulted on Mr. Kwon’s case.
At the hearing, the attending phy-
sician explained that the hospital 
staﬀ  were encountering increasing 
diﬃ  culty attaching the endotrache-
al tube coming out of Mr. Kwon’s 
windpipe to the tube that connects 
it to the ventilator. The e-tube had 
been in place much longer than is 
typical. An e-tube is usually only 
in place for a few hours, days or 
possibly a couple of weeks. In this 
case, it had been in place for over 
100 days. The tube was inserted 
originally because Mr. Kwon’s 
tumor was putting pressure on 
his airway, making it diﬃ  cult for 
him to breathe. Although a tra-
cheostomy is usually performed 
after about two weeks to ventilate 
the lungs rather than keeping the 
endotracheal tube in place, in 
his case, Mr. Kwon’s family did 
not consent to that procedure at 
the time. The attending further 
explained that the patient was no 
longer a candidate for a tracheos-
tomy; the ENT surgeon said it was 
no longer feasible as his tumor had 
grown, despite radiation therapy. 
The attending also explained that 
he did not believe further treat-
ment would be medically eﬀ ective 
and that the hospital staﬀ  should 
focus on keeping Mr. Kwon 
comfortable. He also stated that 
no other physicians at Hopkins 
who had seen Mr. Kwon, includ-
ing ENT surgeons and oncologists, 
believed further therapy would be 
medically eﬀ ective. The oncolo-
gists said they would not give him 
chemotherapy because he was so 
weak. The treating physicians had 
documented that further treatment 
would be medically ineﬀ ective. 
The attending further testiﬁ ed that 
the disagreement with the fam-
ily developed two days earlier 
when the connection between 
Mr. Kwon’s e-tube and the tube 
connected to the ventilator kept 
coming apart. Staﬀ  was having 
a  diﬃ  cult time keeping the tubes 
connected because the end of the 
e-tube was friable and slit and 
there was a leak where the tubes 
were connected. Due to moisture 
in the area where the tubes con-
nected, tape was ineﬀ ective and 
thus not a viable long-term solu-
tion. The physician also said that 
it was probably not feasible to 
replace the e-tube; it might result 
in losing the airway altogether. If 
the airway closed up, it would not 
be possible to insert another tube. 
Furthermore, Mr. Kwon might 
experience considerable pain if 
his physicians removed the e-tube 
as there could be adhesions
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Furthermore, Mr. Kwon might 
experience considerable pain if his 
physicians removed the e-tube as 
there could be adhesions between 
the lining of his windpipe and the 
tube. The physician also indicated 
that Mr. Kwon’s condition met the 
statutory deﬁ nition of an "end-
stage condition."
In response to questions from the 
judge and the hospital attorney, 
the physician distinguished be-
tween the types of care that would 
qualify as comfort care versus 
an escalation of care. He stated 
that he believed that comfort care 
would not include vasopressors, 
antibiotics, or other care to treat 
new complications and that initiat-
ing CPR or increasing the settings 
of the ventilator would be an es-
calation of care. However, he did 
not believe that maintaining the 
ventilation would be an escalation.
The co-chair of the hospital’s 
ethics committee also testiﬁ ed. 
He explained the role of the eth-
ics committee and explained the 
impact of continued treatment 
of Mr. Kwon as requested by the 
family. He said that the treating 
staﬀ  felt moral distress at, among 
other things, the threat to the 
dignity of the patient by continu-
ing ineﬀ ective treatment. The 
co-chair also said that members of 
the ethics committee had met with 
the family in December as well 
as the week of the hearing and 
learned more about the family’s 
perspective. The family felt that 
any form of life is meaningful and 
wanted life-sustaining treatment to 
be continued for as long as pos-
sible. They also continued to hold 
out hope that Mr. Kwon's cancer 
could be treated once his TB was 
under control.
Mr. Kwon’s daughter also testi-
ﬁ ed that the family found meaning 
with every day they had with their 
father. She said he was not awake 
all the time but would interact 
with them when he was awake. 
She said that only a week before 
the hearing, he had become emo-
tional, tearing up as they told him 
stories. Such interactions made it 
diﬃ  cult for the family to accept 
the hospital’s decision to stop the 
ventilator support.
After this hearing, the Court 
issued a TRO requiring JHMC to 
continue ventilator therapy for Mr. 
Kwon, "to the extent possible." 
It also found that Mr. Kwon was 
"suﬀ ering from an end-stage con-
dition" and that "escalation of his 
treatment would be medically inef-
fective within the meaning of Md. 
Code, Sec. 5-601(o) of the Health-
General Article." The Order was 
to stay in eﬀ ect for no longer than 
ten days during which time any 
party could apply for modiﬁ ca-
tion or dissolution of the Order on 
two days’ notice. The Court also 
scheduled a second hearing for the 
morning of Tuesday, January 16th, 
to allow the Court to hear from 
several individuals who were un-
able to come to the initial hearing.
At the second hearing, additional 
members of Mr. Kwon’s family 
were present, including his daugh-
ter, brother, and brother-in-law.  
An internist and pulmonary medi-
cine fellow who had been involved 
in Mr. Kwon’s care also testi-
ﬁ ed on behalf of Johns Hopkins. 
They reported that Mr. Kwon’s 
condition had changed over the 
weekend; one of his pupils was 
not reactive, which could indicate 
deep sedation, metabolic distur-
bance or very severe brain dam-
age. Much of what was explored at 
this hearing was the feasibility of 
transferring Mr. Kwon to another 
hospital, speciﬁ cally whether it 
was a realistic possibility and how 
far the plaintiﬀ  and her family had 
gone in exploring it.
At the end of the hearing, the 
judge asked whether the hospital 
would be agreeable to transferring 
the patient if the family were to 
ﬁ nd a hospital that would accept 
the patient within the next 24 – 48 
hours. The attorney for the hospi-
tal responded that at no point had 
the hospital indicated that it would 
stand in the way of transfer; the 
issue was how much Hopkins was 
required to do pending the transfer 
and how long they would have to 
continue to provide care if transfer 
was not imminent. 
In response to an assertion by the 
plaintiﬀ  that the statute requires a 
hospital to provide LST pending 
transfer if failure to do so would 
result in the death of the patient, 
the judge asked, but "for how 
long?" The plaintiﬀ 's attorney 
responded that the statute does not 
provide a limit. The judge then 
posed the following hypothetical 
case: "suppose that you explored 
with Alexandria [Hospital] and 
they said no and then you said to 
[Hopkins], we are exploring with 
Prince George’s Medical Center 
and they said no two days later, 
and then you said we are explor-
ing with Fairfax Hospital and they 
said no two days later, and then 
you said we are exploring with 
Richmond Hospital and they said 
no. . . On that reading of the stat-
ute, you could prolong the require-
ment of medically ineﬀ ective care 
indeﬁ nitely."
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The judge later stated that he 
rejected the notion that section 
6-613 of the statute "means that 
the moment at which a patient 
or his family articulates the pos-
sibility of a transfer that neces-
sarily means the provider has to 
provide exactly what the family 
requests until that transfer is ac-
complished." Rather, it must be 
interpreted as meaning that LST 
is to be continued if eﬀ orts made 
to transfer are reasonable and the 
possibility of transfer is feasible. 
"My construction of the statute 
is that in these particular circum-
stances, . . . the plaintiﬀ  has failed 
to show that Hopkins Hospital has 
an obligation to undertake every 
treatment modality that the fam-
ily requests while there is pending 
some possibility of transferring 
him to another hospital because 
the plaintiﬀ  has not provided 
evidence that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the transfer will oc-
cur or that it is imminent." 
After the second hearing, the 
court issued a "modiﬁ ed limited 
temporary restraining order" and 
denied the plaintiﬀ ’s request for a 
preliminary injunction because the 
plaintiﬀ  had not been able to show 
that she would likely succeed on 
the merits of her claim that Johns 
Hopkins is required to render 
treatment to Mr. Kwon above what 
it was currently providing. The 
Court issued the modiﬁ ed TRO 
to ensure that Hopkins continued 
to provide the level of care that it 
was currently providing, includ-
ing ventilator therapy, while Mr. 
Kwon’s family pursued a possible 
transfer of Mr. Kwon to another 
hospital. However, the court stated 
that it recognized that the ventila-
tor therapy was being provided 
"only through extraordinary mea-
sures to cope with the deteriorat-
ing breathing tube" and that the 
hospital was "required to use its 
best eﬀ orts to continue the thera-
py, but only as long as . . . feasible 
to do so." Best eﬀ orts, the court 
went on to say, "means reason-
able eﬀ orts in the circumstances 
and does not include requiring a 
nurse or technician manually to 
hold together the connection of the 
ventilator to the breathing tube."
The Court stated that, "with the 
single exception of adjustments 
in the ventilator controls, [the] 
Defendant ha[d] appropriately 
assessed Mr. Kwon’s condition 
and the fact that escalation of his 
care would not be medically ef-
fective within the meaning of Md. 
Code, Sec. 5-601(o) of the Health-
General Article." The Court 
further found that Mr. Kwon had 
an "end-stage condition" and that 
JHMC was not "required to render 
care that it has determined . . . to 
be medically ineﬀ ective in light of 
that condition."
Finally, the Court ordered that 
JHMC cooperate with Mr. Kwon’s 
family to transfer Mr. Kwon if 
a hospital agreed to accept him 
as a patient, that the order would 
remain in eﬀ ect for no longer than 
ten days from the date of initial is-
suance (Jan. 12th) and that it could 
be extended for another ten days 
for "cause shown."
Ultimately, the family was unable 
to ﬁ nd another facility that would 
accept the patient and he died at 
Hopkins Hospital.  
Both this case and the prior case 
indicate a willingness on the part 
of the Maryland courts (at least 
at the trial court level) to give 
credence to clinical evaluations 
of medically ineﬀ ective treatment 
and to allow a hospital to termi-
nate such treatment, despite pa-
tient or family objections, if after a 
reasonable period of time no other 
hospital will accept the patient. 
Such reasonable period of time, at 
least in these two cases, appears to 
be approximately ten days. 
Diane Hoﬀ mann, JD, MS
Jacob A. France Professor of Health Law 
Director, Law & Health Care Program 
University of Maryland School of Law
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Court Intervention & Cultural Sensitivity
Most ethics experts agree that 
courts are the least-favorable 
place to resolve conﬂ icts about 
end-of-life (EOL) treatment. 
State statutes, such as Mary-
land’s Health Care Decisions Act 
(HCDA) and similar legislation in 
California, Texas, and New York,  
oﬀ er an alternative to the courts 
by deﬁ ning a process for resolv-
ing disputes about withholding 
or withdrawing medical interven-
tions that have been deemed med-
ically ineﬀ ective or inappropriate. 
In this issue of the Newsletter, 
we review the ﬁ rst two Maryland 
cases where judges aﬃ  rmed the 
provisions in the HCDA that al-
lowed withdrawing life support 
over surrogates’ objections. Here, 
I oﬀ er some reﬂ ections on what 
role culture may have played and 
clinicians’ duties to respect diﬀ er-
ing cultural beliefs and practices 
in the context of medically inef-
fective or ethically inappropriate 
interventions at the end of life.
Mr. Malhi was from India, tempo-
rarily living in the United States 
(U.S.). His father (who traveled 
from India upon hearing of the 
plans to withdraw his son’s life 
support) only spoke Punjabi. This 
is very little to go on to speculate 
about the core beliefs, practices, 
and values that guided medical 
decision-making for him. Mr. 
Malhi could well have ascribed to 
non-mainstream beliefs and prac-
tices. However, with nothing else 
to go on, we can try to extrapo-
late from statistics: about 80% of 
Indians practice Hinduism, with a 
smaller percentage identifying as 
Muslim, Christian, or Sikh. If Mr. Malhi were Hindu, the concept of 
“karma” may be meaningful (i.e., that past actions aﬀ ect our present life 
circumstances and our current actions aﬀ ect our future circumstances). 
It’s not uncommon for Hindus to consult numerologists to inform impor-
tant decisions, such as naming a child, marrying, or even withdrawing 
life support (see https://www.hinduwebsite.com/hinduism/h_numerol-
ogy.asp). Family harmony is valued, as well as respecting social order. 
Given that Mr. Malhi had been unable to communicate his values and 
preferences prior to becoming comatose, decision-making would fall to 
a surrogate. Assuming Mr. Malhi lacked a spouse or domestic partner, 
according to the HCDA, his father is considered a legally authorized 
surrogate (on par with Mr. Malhi’s mother). There are several challenges 
here in providing “culturally sensitive” care to Mr. Mahli and his family:
 1. DISTANCE: While Mr. Malhi had some family members
   locally available, his surrogate—his father—was thou-
  sands of miles away, requiring communication presum-
  ably through a phone or online Punjabi medical interpret-
  er. This complicates the process by which trust is estab-
  lished between the surrogate and clinical team. 
 2. CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION: While use
   of certiﬁ ed medical interpreters is the gold standard for 
  communicating with patients or family members who 
  don’t speak English, there are known cultural diﬀ erences
   that contribute to gaps in understanding among stake- 
  holders.  A “cultural broker” can help bridge these gaps, 
  but eﬀ ective cultural brokers are not readily available.
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 3. REAL OR PERCEIVED BIAS: We don’t know whether Mr. Malhi was in the U.S. legally, but
   the court makes clear that he didn’t have health insurance to cover his ongoing hospitalization or
   his travel back to India. While these factors should not aﬀ ect decisions about whether life sup-
  port is medically ineﬀ ective, surrogates may perceive that such decisions are inﬂ uenced by the 
  patient’s citizenship, race, or health insurance status, which can thwart the trust-building process 
  necessary to ground eﬀ ective communications.
 4. TIMELINE: The physicians’ decision to withdraw life support occurred relatively quickly after
   the patient’s admission to the ICU (about one month). According to the summary, the ventilator 
  was deemed medically ineﬀ ective after the patient was determined to be in a persistent* vegeta-
  tive state (PVS). However, patients in PVS can remain stable on life support for much longer 
  than one month. What justiﬁ es moving more quickly to withdraw life support rather than giving
   the family more time? In Mr. Malhi’s case, multi-organ failure precluded ICU discharge and pre-
  sumably made his death imminent. Competition for ICU beds is an unavoidable consideration. 
  Indeed, fair resource allocation and institutional stewardship are in tension with motivations to 
  accommodate family members’ emotional, spiritual, religious, and/or cultural needs and values. 
  How much time allotted to loved ones at a dying patient’s bedside is considered an acceptable 
  accommodation? 
Let's assume that all eﬀ orts were made to inform the family of his condition, but despite the staﬀ ’s and ethics 
consultants' best eﬀ orts, the father, acting as the legally authorized surrogate, requested continued interventions 
deemed medically ineﬀ ective or inappropriate (e.g., renal dialysis, ventilatory support, blood products, antibi-
otics, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation eﬀ orts). One justiﬁ cation for moving forward to withhold/withdraw 
life support using the HCDA provisions in such a case is that doing so constitutes a form of “culturally sensi-
tive” medical paternalism. That is, in some cultures, surrogates demonstrate their love and ﬁ delity by asserting 
that “everything be done” for the patient. In some countries, this demand is not interpreted literally by medical 
providers, as it often is here in the U.S.. Furthermore, the expanded options for “doing everything” in U.S. criti-
cal care and trauma units complicates bridging this cultural gap. Having the medical team make a clear recom-
mendation to stop interventions that are merely prolonging Mr. Malhi’s impending death may ease the family’s 
burden in feeling complicit in contributing to his death (see Box on page 11).
Mr. Malhi objected to the hospital withdrawing his son’s ventilator. Perhaps this was because he viewed the act 
of ventilator withdrawal as causing his son’s death. While it’s generally agreed that there is no ethical distinc-
tion between withholding or withdrawing life support (i.e., the underlying illness or injury causes the death, not 
the ventilator withdrawal), it feels diﬀ erent to those involved. Moreover, some individuals recognize a moral
distinction between stopping versus starting life support (e.g., Orthodox Jews). When ICU clinicians institute
“do not escalate treatment” orders for dying patients, they are acknowledging and accommodating this perspec-
tive. Whether this is a reasonable accommodation is an open question, given the burdens of ICU-level care to 
the patient, the competition for ICU beds, and incurred hospital costs (both monetary and non-monetary). Yet, in 
Mr. Malhi’s case, the family objected to the no escalation of treatment order as well—that is, they believed the 
antibiotics and blood transfusions Mr. Malhi had received helped him and should be continued, that they were 
not just “prolonging his dying.” So, Mr. Malhi’s family objected both to withdrawing and withholding interven-
tions because they perceived a beneﬁ t in prolonging life whereas the medical team believed the burdens and 
costs of the interventions would not justify the potential minimal extension of Mr. Malhi’s life.
The case of Hyok Won Kwon presents another opportunity to explore to what extent culture played a role in a 
patient’s trajectory of care and in ultimate court involvement. While a full exploration of Korean culture and 
its variations is beyond what can be presented here ("Kwon and "Lee" are common Korean last names so it is 
assumed that the patient was Korean), general characteristics include a strong regard for ﬁ lial piety (respecting 
and honoring one’s blood relatives and ancestors), clearly divided family roles, and family interdependence over 
individualism (Kim & Kelly, 2006). Koreans, especially elders, may prefer Hanbang, also known as Hanyak,
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and Oriental medicine, as the preferred method of health care. This is based on balance between um (akin to 
yin) and yang, and balance of ﬁ re, earth, metal, water, and wood. It’s not uncommon to blend these beliefs and 
practices with Western medical interventions. Whether such cultural beliefs were at play in the decision to forgo 
Mr. Kwon’s tracheostomy is an open question. It’s indicated that his family believed that any form of life was 
meaningful and they valued time spent around his bedside, which is why they requested that life-sustaining 
interventions be continued for as long as possible. Such beliefs are common across diﬀ erent cultures and reli-
gions.
What is at issue for both of these cases is what we consider a “culturally sensitive” accommodation. In the 
Kwon case, the decision to not escalate medical care and to stop the ventilator was inﬂ uenced by physically not 
being able to continue mechanical ventilation (i.e., the lack of a tracheostomy and deteriorating endotracheal 
tube precluded maintaining the airway necessary to continue mechanical ventilation). In the Malhi case, the 
decision to stop the ventilator was based on an appraisal that keeping him alive for a few days (presumably a 
maximum of two weeks, assuming his kidneys had shut down) was of no beneﬁ t. Brown (2018) suggests that in 
such cases clinicians stand by their appraisal that such interventions are not suﬃ  ciently beneﬁ cial to justify bur-
dens and costs, to avoid confusion that terms such as “medically futile” or “ethically inappropriate” engender.
The discussion surrounding burdens to the patient and to the staﬀ  is interesting. Descriptions of suﬀ ering in-
ﬂ icted on Mr. Malhi are questionable given the reported medical opinion that he was irreversibly unconscious 
(in which case, he would be incapable of suﬀ ering). In both cases, however, eﬀ ects on staﬀ  were acknowledged 
(i.e., staﬀ  experienced moral distress by having to inﬂ ict interventions that appeared to cause harm or indignity 
to these patients). What about eﬀ ects on survivors? This is the question at issue. Surely, providing culturally 
sensitive care doesn’t mean doing whatever family members request. In considering what “doing everything” 
might entail to minimize future regrets of a dying patient’s kin, what do we consider compassionate and fair?
Brierley, et al. (2013) found that out of 203 pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) patients for whom withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment was recommended, 11 (~5%) involved protracted discussions with parents who object-
ed, largely based on religious beliefs (e.g., sanctity of life). The authors observed that “Christian fundamentalist 
churches with African evangelical origins featured most frequently” (Brierley, et al., 2013, p. 574). Perhaps the 
same justiﬁ cation for mandating blood transfusions to children of Jehovah’s Witnesses can justify overriding 
such individual’s requests. Kassim and Alias (2016) and Rezaei et al. (2016) suggest alternative interpretations 
of vitalist religious positions.
Regarding fairness, Kapottos and Youngner (2015) point out a notable shortcoming of the Texas Advance Direc-
tive Act (TADA), a law that is similar to the HCDA but includes additional procedural mandates:
 By applying itself only to cases brought by physicians, the process incompletely takes into account the
  values touted in the TADA—namely, preventing harm to patients, avoiding the provision of unseemly
  care, and providing good stewardship of medical resources … In order to fully preserve professional 
 and institutional integrity as the TADA claims to do, policies should act to prevent physicians from 
 oﬀ ering or initiating [emphasis added] treatments that have little or no beneﬁ t to patients while 
 inﬂ icting signiﬁ cant harm. Truly fair processes would consider the entire picture. Failure to do so is at 
 best an example of performative inconsistency. At worst it could be viewed as hypocritical or unjust 
 because it does not treat similar cases alike. (Kapottos &Youngner, 2015, pp. 36-37)
By relying on individual physicians to decide to withhold or withdraw treatments considered medically ineﬀ ec-
tive, instances of bias and injustice (whether actual or perceived) may thwart other eﬀ orts to establish the trust 
that obviates resorting to courts to settle disputes. Kapottos and Youngner single out Boston Children’s Hospital 
as the only institution they are aware of that has eﬀ ectively addressed this issue at the organizational level
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How to Avoid Court in Medically Ineﬀ ective Treatment Cases
In many cases, if information is communicated to a surrogate in a culturally sensitive manner, the Mary-
land Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA) provisions need not be invoked and court involvement can be 
avoided. How might this be accomplished? Kon (2011) provides one such approach, which he dubbed 
“informed nondissent.” This would involve ﬁ rst conveying that the patient is dying, using known com-
munication standards for breaking bad news (Baile et al., 2000). Then, the surrogate would be told what 
would and would not be done for the patient, and if the surrogate didn’t object, the team would proceed 
with the plan. For example, the physician might say: “We’re going to treat your [dad, husband, son…] 
like we would a member of our own family. We will treat him with love and respect in his ﬁ nal days. 
We’ll make sure he doesn’t suﬀ er” (Kon, 2011, p. 22). Questions or objections (e.g., “There must be 
something more you can do to save him!”) should be answered directly (e.g., “I’m so sorry. It’s too late. 
He is too ill. All the things we use here, like shocking the heart after it stops or cleansing the kidneys 
when they shut down, won’t work for your [dad, husband, son …]. They won’t prevent his death.”). The 
HCDA requirement to inform the surrogate that an intervention is being withheld or withdrawn because 
it is medically ineﬀ ective or inappropriate, and to allow the option of transfer, is only relevant if the sur-
rogate objects to the medical recommendations. 
Baile, W.F., Buckman, R., Lenzi, R., Glober, G., Beale, E.A., & Kudelka, A.P. (2000).  SPIKES- A six-
step protocol for delivering bad news: Application to the patient with cancer. Oncologist, 5(4), 302-311.
Kon, A.A. (2011). Informed non-dissent: A better option than slow codes when families cannot bear to 
say "let her die". Am J Bioeth, 11(11), 22-3. 
(i.e., providing compassionate, 
culturally sensitive end-of-life 
care that sets consistent limits 
on interventions deemed medi-
cally ineﬀ ective). They suggest 
creating and sharing a taxonomy 
of cases referred to courts to 
enhance transparency and help 
guide practice. Perhaps toward 
that end, Mr. Kwon and Mr. 
Mahli have served this greater 
purpose by starting this process of 
reﬂ ection.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
* NOTE: Recent guidelines call 
for a change in terminology from 
“permanent” or “persistent” veg-
etative state” to “chronic” vegeta-
tive state (Giacino et al., 2018).
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The Ethics of Medical Repatriation
The Malhi case brings to mind the 
issue of medical repatriation, the 
practice where hospitals transfer 
immigrant patients to their home 
countries for continued care. In 
their eﬀ ort to seek continuing care 
for Mr. Malhi, his family sought 
to delay the hospital from ceas-
ing life-sustaining treatment while 
they tried to arrange transport to 
a hospital in his native India. The 
Malhi case is unique in that the 
patient’s family was requesting 
transfer; in many cases, the hos-
pital initiates transfer for patients 
whose conditions no longer neces-
sitate hospital-level care. As a re-
sult of their immigrant status (e.g. 
undocumented, visa-based, etc.), 
these patients often lack health 
insurance, the ﬁ nancial resources 
to pay out-of-pocket, eligibility 
for public beneﬁ t programs, or 
the familial support necessary to 
facilitate transfer to subacute care 
facilities or home settings. 
These cases present a signiﬁ cant 
challenge for U.S. hospitals. The 
Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act of 1986 re-
quires all Medicare-participating 
hospitals to screen and stabilize 
any individual who presents with 
an emergency medical condition. 
Once stabilized, however, patients 
may have continuing medical or 
care needs that would best be met 
in a subacute facility. Subacute 
facilities, however, have no legal 
obligation to accept such patients 
and hospitals face the prospect 
of providing unreimbursed care 
indeﬁ nitely. Sometimes, when 
other facilities decline to ac-
cept a patient like Malhi, it is an 
indicator that the currently pro-
vided medical interventions are 
medically ineﬀ ective (sometimes 
referred to as “non-beneﬁ cial” 
in that they are only prolonging 
the dying process). The question 
of how a patient’s immigration 
status is impacting these decisions, 
and what is considered “fair” to 
the patient and to the hospital, is 
complicated.
One provider relayed a story of 
a woman who suﬀ ered a major 
stroke two weeks after arriving in 
the U.S. on a visa. Once stabilized, 
her U.S.-based family members 
refused to accept the patient in 
their home and the patient’s lack 
of eligibility for medical assis-
tance ruled out placement in a 
skilled nursing facility. Ultimately, 
the hospital paid for the patient’s 
care in a skilled nursing facility 
followed by a group home over 
the course of several years until 
family members in the native 
country expressed a willingness to 
care for the patient. The hospital 
then funded the patient’s transport 
to her native country including 
transportation and lodging costs 
for a family member to accompa-
ny her on the trip. The aforemen-
tioned case cost the hospital more 
than $1.5M in uncompensated 
care. 
Hospitals across the country 
are facing similar cases and it is 
becoming increasingly common 
to resolve such cases through 
medical repatriation. A 2012 study 
found more than 800 instances of 
medical repatriations in the U.S., 
likely an underestimate of the 
practice given the lack of reporting 
requirements.1 Changes to federal 
funding of healthcare under the 
Aﬀ ordable Care Act have likely 
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contributed to greater reliance on 
the practice in the last four years.1 
Medical repatriation raises chal-
lenging legal and ethical questions 
for healthcare providers. Indeed, 
the practice has been met with 
pointed criticism from bioethicists, 
legal scholars and members of 
the media. Some have argued that 
such cases constitute human rights 
violations while others assert that 
only the federal government may 
legally “deport” individuals pres-
ent in the U.S. without authoriza-
tion.2 There have been troubling 
examples cited, in some instances 
involving legal immigrants and 
U.S. citizens. In 2008, for exam-
ple, the University Medical Cen-
ter in Tucson sought to transfer 
Elliott Bustamante, an infant with 
U.S. citizenship born with Down 
syndrome and a heart condition, 
to Mexico over the objections 
of his undocumented immigrant 
parents.3 A few years earlier, a 
Florida hospital forcibly trans-
ported an undocumented immi-
grant back to his native Guatemala 
despite an ongoing legal dispute 
playing out in court as well as in-
adequate services in Guatemala to 
treat patients with traumatic brain 
injuries.4 
In addition to the myriad legal 
questions, medical repatriation 
also implicates a number of ethi-
cal concerns regarding autonomy, 
informed consent, justice, beneﬁ -
cence, non-maleﬁ cence and trust, 
among others. I discuss several of 
these below in an eﬀ ort to high-
light some important consider-
ations for hospitals as they consid-
er medical repatriation for patients 
in their care.
Autonomy and Informed Consent
Respect for autonomy or an indi-
vidual’s right to self-determination 
in the healthcare context is a core 
principle of biomedical ethics. 
While not the situation in the 
Malhi case, in many instances, 
particularly those involving 
undocumented patients, repatria-
tion occurs without the informed 
consent of the patient or in direct 
opposition to the patient’s, or their 
family’s, stated care preferences. 
Of particular concern to critics 
of involuntary medical repatria-
tion is the extrajudicial nature of 
the process.1 While Immigrations 
and Customs Enforcement may 
be contacted in some cases, there 
are many instances where hospi-
tals are transferring immigrants 
to their native countries with no 
governmental or judicial oversight 
and patients are therefore unable 
to seek recourse if they oppose 
the transfer. As others have noted, 
medical repatriation implicates 
both health care and immigration 
law. For undocumented immi-
grants, return to a home country 
can have serious consequences 
for their ability to return to the 
U.S. (i.e., inability to return for a 
speciﬁ ed period of time ranging 
from three to ten years) and some 
have argued that clear informa-
tion on those consequences needs 
to be communicated to the patient 
in order for consent to be fully 
informed.5
Beneﬁ cence and Non-maleﬁ cence
The principle of beneﬁ cence 
requires healthcare providers to 
act in the best interests of their 
patients while the principle of 
non-maleﬁ cence refers to the 
provider’s duty to do no harm to 
the patient. In the case detailed at 
the beginning of this article, the 
patient required a level of care 
typically provided by a skilled 
nursing facility—a type of facility 
that is largely not present in her 
native country. Even in those in-
stances where analogous facilities 
are present in the native country, 
standards of care and quality may 
diﬀ er markedly from those in the 
U.S. The principles of beneﬁ cence 
and non-maleﬁ cence create an 
obligation on the part of hospitals 
to fully explore care options in the 
patient’s home country and work 
with identiﬁ ed institutions or 
family caregivers to execute the 
transfer in a manner that mini-
mizes risk to the patient. 
Justice
In considering the practice of 
medical repatriation for solving 
conﬂ icts about medically ineﬀ ec-
tive treatment, justice concerns 
are also raised. Some bioethicists 
claim that determining whether a 
treatment is medically ineﬀ ective 
simply boils down to a harm-ben-
eﬁ t analysis, and that it can (and 
should) be considered separately 
from resource allocation factors. 
According to this view, medical 
repatriation should not be an op-
tion because such patients should 
not be transferred anywhere—in-
stead, medically ineﬀ ective treat-
ment should simply be withheld 
or withdrawn. The fact that such 
an approach would reduce cost 
burdens to the hospital is inciden-
tal. Others disagree, arguing that 
cost and resource allocation is 
inextricably linked to the ethical 
analysis in these cases, and that 
the principle of justice must be 
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weighed against the principles of 
beneﬁ cence and non-maleﬁ cence. 
For example, one could argue that 
there is no harm from continuing
life support for a patient like 
Malhi because persons in PVS 
cannot suﬀ er, and given that his 
family members viewed postpon-
ing his death as a beneﬁ t, this 
could have justiﬁ ed continuing 
life support. It is justice concerns 
that deem such a beneﬁ t as insuf-
ﬁ cient when weighed against the 
costs. The hospital has to meet 
the needs of all the patients it 
serves. Thus, the principle of 
justice plays a signiﬁ cant role 
in determining whether medical 
repatriation is ethically justiﬁ ed. 
Patients for whom continued care 
is medically ineﬀ ective without 
discharge options continue to oc-
cupy a bed, medicine, and staﬃ  ng 
resources that may be needed by 
others. Hospitals bear the costs of 
extended periods of care for these 
patients. If they pursue medical 
repatriation, they also may shoul-
der the expense associated with 
the transfer, which often includes 
specialized medical transport 
for patients with complex condi-
tions (e.g. ventilators). Medical 
repatriation raises the question of 
whether this is the most just use 
of a hospital’s limited resources 
And the way the question is an-
swered may spill over to the way 
hospitals handle decisions about 
withholding or withdrawing medi-
cally ineﬀ ective treatment, and 
whether immigrants are unfairly 
disadvantaged in these decisions.
Trust
Trust plays a critical role in the 
healthcare enterprise. When hos-
pitals eﬀ ectively deport patients 
without their consent, there is an 
erosion of trust in the care relationship that may result in a patient being 
unwilling to disclose information that is critical to decisions about treat-
ment or reduces the likelihood that patients will seek needed care in the 
ﬁ rst place. 
This failure to seek care may have signiﬁ cant public health consequenc-
es, particularly in cases involving infectious disease. Further, delayed 
care may result in the hospital providing higher-cost care than would 
have been needed if the patient felt comfortable seeking care earlier, as 
well as poorer health outcomes for the patient. 
Ethical approaches to medical repatriation
In his article on the practice, bioethicist Dr. Mark Kuczweski proposed 
three requirements for ethical repatriation:
 1. the transfer must be in the patient’s best interest, indepen-
  dent of cost concerns;
 2. the patient or surrogate must provide informed consent to
   the transfer; and
 3. the hospital must exercise due diligence to ensure that the 
  patient’s medical needs are met upon return.6
While the best interest of the patient should certainly be a top priority, 
disregarding the cost factor entirely is rarely possible, particularly for 
safety net hospitals that provide a much greater proportion of uncompen-
sated care and are already stretched ﬁ nancially. 
Policy approaches to medical repatriation
In light of the ﬁ nancial constraints hospitals currently face, it is likely 
that the practice of medical repatriation will continue unabated. While 
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ANITA TARZIAN  NAMED HASTINGS CENTER FELLOW
Dr. Anita Tarzian has been elected a Hastings Center Fellow in recognition of 
her contributions to the ﬁ eld of bioethics. Dr. Tarzian is an associate professor at 
the University of Maryland School of Nursing in addition to her role as Program 
Coordinator for the Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network.
Dr. Tarzian has worked as a research and ethics consultant since earning her 
doctoral degree in nursing ethics in 1998, providing guidance and consulting 
services in clinical ethics, research ethics, and research methods. Her scholar-
ship, teaching, and mentorship have centered on clinical ethics (including the 
development of national standards for health care ethics consultation), palliative care, end-of-life care, dis-
ability rights, among other areas.
Professor Diane Hoﬀ mann, Director of the Law & Health Care Program and founder of the Maryland 
Healthcare Ethics Committee Network, said of Dr. Tarzian's appointment, "This is well deserved recogni-
tion of Dr. Tarzian as a leader in the ﬁ eld of bioethics. In addition to her active and extensive involvement 
in clinical ethics consultation, she is an accomplished researcher whose work has contributed signiﬁ cantly 
to national and international discussions of some of the most challenging ethical issues in healthcare."
Founded in 1969, the Hastings Center is an internationally recognized bioethics research institution dedi-
cated to the examination of fundamental ethical issues in health care, science and technology. Dr. Tarzian 
joins a community of more than 200 individuals who have been recognized for their scholarly contribu-
tions to the ﬁ eld of bioethics.
the best interest of the patient should be the paramount concern, hospitals should consider the development of 
policies and protocols to address medical repatriation and begin systematic data collection on such cases. 
Data would provide a measure of accountability to ensure that policies are being implemented equitably while 
also informing advocacy eﬀ orts to create funding streams to support hospitals in this eﬀ ort. 
Given its position at the nexus of immigration law and health policy, medical repatriation is a politically sensi-
tive but increasingly common practice. It has faced strong criticism with some alleging that medical repatriation 
amounts to “international patient dumping.”7 In the absence of meaningful legislation or regulation, however, 
hospitals must take responsibility for developing policies that adequately balance the various legal and ethical 
issues at play. Policies that clearly deﬁ ne decision-making protocols and informed consent processes for medi-
cal repatriation would be an important ﬁ rst step and would clearly demonstrate institutional commitment to 
conducting medical repatriation in a just and ethical manner.
References listed on page 19.
Lauren Levy, JD, MPH
Managing Director, Law & Health Care Program 
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS
FEBRUARY
28 – March 3:    28th Annual APPE International Conference sponsored by the Association for Practical 
and Professional Ethics, Baltimore, MD. Visit: https://appe-ethics.org/2019-call-for-proposals-2/.
MARCH
21-22:   Vulnerability and Presence: Sixth National Nursing Ethics Conference, Los Angeles, CA. Visit: 
http://ethicsofcaring.org/. 
21-22:    Deeply Rooted: Healthcare Ethics in an Era of Change, Healthcare Ethics Consortium 2019 
Annual Conference, Atlanta, GA. Visit: https://hcecg.org/event-2970721.
28-30:    Conﬂ ict Resolution and Clinical-Setting Mediation for Healthcare, sponsored by the Center for 
Conﬂ ict Resolution in Healthcare, Memphis, TN. Visit: www.healthcare-mediation.net.
28-30:    8th International Health Humanities Meeting, Chicago, IL. Visit: https://healthhumanitiesconsor-
tium.com/conferences-2/2019-chicago/.
MARCH
29:   The Ethics of Seeking and Assessing "Quality of Life," Annual Medical Ethics Conference spon-
sored by the University of Pittsburgh Center for Bioethics & Health Law, Pittsburgh, PA. Visit: https://
bioethics.pitt.edu/consortium-ethics-program/cep-calendar.
APRIL
5-6:  Reproductive Ethics Conference, sponsored by Alden March Bioethics Institute, The Desmond Ho-
tel, Albany, NY. Visit: http://www.amc.edu/Academic/bioethics/ 
11-12:  Pushing the Boundaries: Scientiﬁ c Innovation and Biomedical Ethics, sponsored by Cin-
cinatti Children's Hospital, Liberty Township, OH.   Visit: https://cchmc.cloud-cme.com/defaut.
aspx?P=5&EID=26366.
11-12:  Controlling Death: Ethics, law, and the health professions, sponsored by Harvard Medical 
School’s Center for Bioethics, Boston, MA. Visit: http://bioethics.hms.harvard.edu/annual-bioethics-con-
ference.
13-15:  Age and Longevity in the 21st Century: Science, Policy, and Ethics, Sponsored by the Global Bio-
ethics Initiative, New York, NY. Visit: http://globalbioethics.org/upcmnevents/. 
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APRIL
25-26:  Patient-Centered Medicine, Annual John Collins Harvey Lecture & 6th Annual Pellegrino Sym-
posium, Sponsored by Georgetown University’s Center for Clinical Bioethics, Georgetown University 
Hotel and Conference Center, Washington, DC. Visit: https://clinicalbioethics.georgetown.edu/pellegri-
noseminarandharveylecture 
29 – May 3:  Bioethics Intensive Course, sponsored by the Houston Methodist Hospital & The Center for 
Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, TX. Visit: bcm.edu/ethics/
bioethics-intensive.
MAY
3:  Communicating About Values and Valuing Communication in Healthcare, sponsored by the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Center for Bioethics & Health Law, Pittsburgh, PA. Visit: https://bioethics.pitt.edu/
consortium-ethics-program/cep-calendar.
15-17:  7th Annual Conference of the Academy for Professionalism in Health Care, New Orleans, LA. 
Visit: https://www.academy-professionalism.org/. 
22-25:  The 15th Annual International Conference on Clinical Ethics & Consultation (ICCEC), Vienna, 
Austria. Visit: http://iccec2019.org/.
CALENDAR OF EVENTS  
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RECURRING EVENTS 
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series & Ethics for Lunch series, either at 
Sheik Zayed Tower Chevy Chase Conference Center (1800 Orleans St.) Room 2117 or Feinstone 
Hall, E2030, Bloomberg School of Public Health (615 N. Wolfe St.) Baltimore, MD. 12N-1:15PM. 
Visit: http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/educationtraining-2/seminar-series & http://www.
bioethicsinstitute.org/eﬂ 
February 25: Diane Meier, MD, FACP,  Hutzler-Rives Memorial Lecture: “Ethical Principles in 
Action: Palliative Care and People Living with Serious Illness” (Zayed)
March 4: Dominic A. Sisti, PhD, Director, Scattergood Program for Applied Ethics in Behavioral 
Health Care, University of Pennsylvania (TBD)
March 11: David S. Jones, MD, PhD, “Must Innovators Study the Unintended Consequences of 
New Therapies? Lessons from Cardiac Therapeutics” (Zayed)
March 25: Marion Danis, MD, “Engaging the Public in Setting Health Care Priorities” (Feinstone)
April 8: Brian Carter, MD, Hutzler-Rives Memorial Lecture: “Insights from patienthood: A 
pediatrician and bioethicist’s reﬂ ections on pediatric palliative care” (Zayed)
April 22: Eﬀ y Vayena, PhD, “Digital Health Ethics: The Systemic Oversight Approach” 
(Feinstone) 
May 13: Holly Fernandez Lynch, JD, MBE, “Evaluating IRB Quality and Eﬀ ectiveness” 
(Feinstone)
Also visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/eﬂ  to view topics for the Ethics for Lunch series every 
third Tuesday from 12:00 to 1:15 pm (Zayed). Co-sponsored by Johns Hopkins’ Hospital Ethics 
Committee & Consultation Service and Berman Institute of Bioethics. CME & lunch provided!
Continuing Education 1-hour Online Programs provided by the Medical Ethics & Health Policy 
department of the University of Pennsylvania: Children’s Roles in Medical Decisions, Ethics of 
Human Research, Neuroethics, & Tarasoﬀ  Duties. Visit: https://www.med.upenn.edu/ethics-and-
policy-online/continuing-education.
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The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, 
established by the Law and Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to facilitate and enhance ethical reﬂ ection in all aspects 
of decision making in health care settings by supporting and providing informational and educational 
resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network 
attempts to achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within 
their institution and as they strive to assist their institution act consistently with its mission 
statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and 
members of the general public on ethical issues in health care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of 
patients in Maryland.
MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes 
support from aﬃ  liate members who provide additional ﬁ nancial support.
The Ethics of Medical Repatriation (continued from page 15) 
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